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Abstract 
In this paper we use a large overlapping generations model with individuals that differ 
across age, productivity and native status to assess the effects on the pension system of different 
immigration quotas in the context of an aging population by computing how much should social 
security taxes be rised in order to pay for the pension burden in two model economies. The first 
one is the standard model pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) where skilled and 
unskilled workers are perfect substitutes in the production process. In the second model economy, 
individuals with different skill levels are imperfect substitutes as in Canova and Ravn (1998). The 
main result of the paper is that half of the reduction of the social security tax rate associated with 
immigration in the standard model is lost when skilled and unskilled individual are imperfect 
substitutes. Consequently, the standard model with perfect substitution overestimates the ability of 
immigration inflows to sustain the pension system in Spain.  
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1 Introduction
Although demographic ageing is not a new phenomenon, it has now assumed unprecedented
proportions owing to the post-war baby boom, and the baby bust that followed. One particular
case is Spain, where the aging of the baby boom generation and the very low levels of the fertility
rates, e.g. 1.17 and 1.2 in 1995 and 2000 repectively, are expected to increase the share of the
elderly (60 and over) over the population from 38% in 1995 to 83% by 2050 according to Eurostat
Demographic Statistics 1996. As the age structure of immigrants is in general younger than that
of the host population, there is a popular belief that a more generous immigration policy can
increase the working-age population and help to reduce the pension burden of the elderly by
2030-2055 which is when the large cohorts born in the 60s and 70s in Spain will be retired. In this
paper we use a large overlapping generations model to study quantitatively whether immigration
policy is a useful tool to improve the sustainability of the social security system in the context
of the aging of the baby-boom generation in Spain. The question to be answered is related to
the one posed by Collado, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Valera (2001) for Spain, although they use the
methodology of generational accounting. In contrast, we use a fully speci¯ed dynamic general
equilibrium model. In this sense the approach of this paper is similar in spirit to Storesletten
(2000). In that study he found that it is possible to ¯nd an immigration policy which depends
on the age and skills of immigrants that can mitigate the ¯scal problems associated to the
aging of the baby-boom generation in the U.S. In contrast, our approach takes as given the
age, fertility and skill characteristics of current immigrants in Spain and studies the e®ects of
several immigration quotas on the sustainability of the social security system over the next
decades. We also depart from other existing papers (Razin and Sadka (1999a, 1999b)) that have
addressed immigration and social security issues in general equilibrium frameworks with perfect
substitution among skilled groups. In particular, we compare the properties of several model
economies that only di®er from each other in the degree of substitution between workers with
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di®erent productivity, as in Canova and Ravn (1999). Taking into account that immigrants are
usually unskilled workers, the assumption of perfect substitution taken by Storesletten (2000)
and Razin and Sadka (1999a, 1999b) rules out any change in the skill premium induced by
the in°ow of immigrants and consequently the e®ects associated with it. In order to evaluate
whether the standard assumption of perfect substitution is critical when studying the e®ects of
immigration on the sustainability of the pension system I proceed as follows.
First we consider an initial steady state characterized by the age structure of the Spanish pop-
ulation in 1995. In this model economy individuals of the same generation are heterogeneous in
productivity so that we can endogenously replicate both the earnings distribution in 1994 and the
percentage of the population a®ected by some institutional features of the spanish social security
system such as the existence of a maximum and minimum pension limit. In this framework, we
compare the e®ects on the pension system of di®erent immigration policies in the context of an
aging population by computing how much should social security taxes be rised in order to pay
for the pension burden in two model economies. The ¯rst one is the standard model pioneered
by Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) where skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes in
the production process. In the second model economy, individuals with di®erent skill levels are
imperfect substitutes as in Canova and Ravn (1998). The results indicate that over the period
1995-2055, an immigration policy of 0.26% in the model economy with imperfect substitution
induces a similar adjustment of the social security tax rate as an immigration rate of 0.12% in
the standard model economy with perfect substitution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economies I inves-
tigate. Section 3 presents the main results of the paper and Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by agents that live a maximum of I periods. Each agent is indexed
by age i, time t, type j and native status n. An agent with n = 1 is a native and n = 2 is an
immigrant. Conditional on being native, an individual of age i can be less or more productive
depending on the j type. Conditional on being an immigrant (n = 2), each individual is indexed
by the age at migration (denoted by j), consequently since there are 20 age groups then there
are 20 possible types of immigrants. All immigrants are equally productive. Notice that it
cannot be the case that an individual is an immigrant with age i such that j ¸ i. Upon arrival
at the age of IA an agent starts taking decisions. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of
time that can be allocated to work or leisure up to age IR¡1. After this age agents retire. Each
agent faces an age dependent probability of surviving between age i and age i +1 at t denoted
by si;t. Then the unconditional probability of reaching age i for an individual that has age v
at t is ¼iv;t =
Qi
k=v+1 sk¡1;t+k¡v¡1 with ¼vv;t = 1. Let ¹i;t;j;n be the share of age-i and type-j-n
individuals over the total population at time t.
Agents reach adulthood at 20 and live up to age 95, after which death is certain. Each model
period corresponds to 5 years. We take the age structure of the population of 1995 as the
initial condition in order to propagate the population to the future. In that year, the stock of
immigrants represented 1% of the total population (source: Direccion General de la Policia del
Ministerio del Interior and INE. This number and the fact that there is no dataset available in
order to know when existing immigrants entered the country, have lead us to make no distinction
between immigrants and natives in the initial steady state. After this date, given the fertility rate
of natives (1.17 in 1995) and the age pro¯le of mortality in 1995, we propagate the age structure
of the population until it becomes stationary under three scenarios about the immigration rate,
de¯ned as the number of immigrants entering the country as a percentage of the total population
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in a given year. The ¯rst one is the baseline case with no immigration. And the second and
third scenarios have an immigration rate of 0.12% and 0.26% respectively. In terms of the total
population in 1995 these rates represent around 50000 (the actual in°ow in 2001) and 100000
immigrants annually. The age distribution of these migration °ows are taken to be constant
and equal to the current ones in Spain. Finally, immigrants are assumed to have the same
mortality pro¯le as natives and reproduce according to a fertility rate 1.4 times higher than
natives (Institute Nacional de Estadistica). Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the dependency
ratio (the share of those aged +65 over those with age 20-64) under the three immigration
scenarios.
2.2 Preferences
At each point in time agents are assumed to maximize lifetime utility. Hence the problem
of the typical agent that at t has age i = v (v ¸ IA) is to choose consumption and leisure
li;t;j;n = 1 ¡hi;t;j;n to solve the problem
Max
IX
i=v
¯i¡v¼iv;tU(ci;t+i¡v;j;n;hi;t+i¡v;j;n) (1)
subject to the following period-by-period constraint
ai+1;t+1;j;n = (1 + rt(1 ¡ ¿k))ai;t;j;n + yi;t;j;n ¡ ci;t;j;n (2)
with ai+1;t+1;j;n ¸ 0, a1;t;j;n = 0, aI+1;t;j;n = 0. The discount parameter is ¯, and is assumed
to be the same for all agents. Borrowing is not possible and agents accumulate asset holdings
to smooth consumption over time. rt is the interest rate net of depreciation, ai+1;t+1;j;n denotes
next period asset holdings, yi;t;j;n is labor income net of taxes plus transfers and ¿k is a propor-
tional capital income tax. Let ei;j;n be the e±ciency index, ¿ss;t the social security proportional
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tax, ¿l a proportional labor income tax and di;t;j;n the social security bene¯ts. Finally wj;t
denotes real wages, that are indexed by skill type, and Bt is the accidental bequest received
at t. These considerations allow us to de¯ne the labor income net of taxes plus transfers as
yi;t;j;n = wj;tei;j;nhi;t;j;n(1¡ ¿l¡¿ss;t)+di;t;j;n+Bt. The period utility function is of the constant
relative risk-aversion class
u(c; l) =
(cµl1¡µ)1¡¾
1 ¡¾ (3)
where the inverse of the elasticity of substitution ¾ and the share of consumption µ has been
set such that the average time spent working is around 1/3 and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is consistent with the empirical estimates reviewed in Auberbach and Kotliko®
(1987). Hence we use ¾ = 2 and µ = 0:33. The discount rate parameter is set equal to ¯ = 0:987
so as to reproduce a private capital-output ratio of 2:5 in the spanish economy as reported by
Puch and Licandro (1997).
2.2.1 E±ciency unit pro¯le
In order to generate enough heterogeneity across the individuals of the same generation, the age
speci¯c labor productivities are set following the procedure used by Huggett and Ventura (1999)
and is as follows. First, using the European Comunity Household Panel (ECHP, 1994) I compute
an age speci¯c pro¯le of mean logarithmic gross hourly wages denoted by y^i for workers aged
bewteen 20 and 64. Then, it is assumed that upon birth an agent faces a permanent individual
shock z to its log e±ciency which determines its working productivity over its career. This shock
is normally distributed as z » N(0;¾2z) and the log e±ciency parameter at age 1 is y1=y^1 + z.
Then an agent's log lifetime e±ciency pro¯le evolves according to yi¡ y^i = yi¡1¡ y^i¡1. Finally
the e±ciency pro¯le is ei;j = exp(y^i + z). For computational purposes I follow Huggett and
Ventura (1998) and approximate the shock process z with 20 evenly-space values between ¡4¾z
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and 4¾z. The probabilities are calculated by integrating the area under the normal distribution
and the standard deviation of the stochastic process ¾z is set to 0.532 so that the Gini index
of the distribution of gross hourly wages of the model economy matches that of the ECHP
data, being equal to 0.31. Given this heterogeneity, less productive individuals with abilities
from 1 to 10 are considered unskilled, and those with ability levels between 11 and 20 are
skilled. Consequently, in the initial steady state, half of the population is skilled. Regarding the
productivity of foreign workers, we assume that they are unskilled and earn 80% of the average
wage of natives (Collado et al (2001)).
2.3 Production Technology
Production in period t is given by a standard constant returns to scale production function
that converts capital Kt and labor Nt into output. The technology At improves over time at a
constant rate because of labor augmenting technological change, At+1 = (1 +¸)At. The capital
share parameter is ® = 0:375 following the estimates of Domenech and Taguas (1995) for the
Spanish economy. The productivity growth has been set to ¸ = 1:5% in annual terms which is
the average growth of per-capita consumption over the period 1960-1995. Hence,
Yt = F(Kt; AtNt) = K
®
t (AtNt)
1¡® (4)
with
Nt = B(°L
1¡½
t +(1 ¡ °)H1¡½t )
1
1¡½ (5)
where Lt and Ht denotes unskilled and skilled workers respectively. The procedure to set the
values of the inverse of the elasticity of substitution ½, the parameter B and the share parameter
° is as follows. In the model economy with perfect substitution, a change in the relative supply
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of high skilled workers does not translate into changes in the relative wages on individuals by
skill. Consequently, this is the case where ½ = 0. In addition, the value that governs the overall
e±ciency of labor input is set to a normalized value of B = 1. Finally, the value of the share
parameter ° is set such that whwl = 1. Notice that this means that the age-pro¯le of earnings in
the model economy which consists of a product of the market wage wj and the e±ciency index
ei;j;n resembles the age-speci¯c pro¯le of e±ciency units ei;j;n that already captures our targeted
Gini index of wages. Since the relative wage is given by
wh
wl
=
°
1 ¡ °
³H
L
´¡½
(6)
then, when ½ = 0, whwl = 1 if ° = 0:5. On the other hand, Katz and Murphy (1992), among
others, have studied the existence of imperfect substitutability among workers with di®erent
levels of education. Their estimates of the elasticities of complementarity imply values of the
½ parameter between 0.8 and 2. In this paper we use ½ = 1:2 as our benchmark case for the
case of imperfect substitution. Then, the share parameter ° is set such that whwl = 1, yielding
° = 0:2518, and the parameter that governs the overall e±ciency of the labor input B is set so
that the level of wages equals the level of spot wages in the benchmark model economy with
perfect substitutability between high and low skilled workers, hence both model economies share
the same features in the initial steady state. This yields B = 0:8964. Finally, ¯rms rent labor
and capital at given wages and net interest rate to maximize
F(Kt; AtNt) ¡ (rt + ±)Kt ¡wl;tLt ¡ wh;tHt (7)
where ± is the depreciation rate for capital and is set to match the average ratio of gross
investment over output I/Y=22.5%. This yields a value of ± = 9% in annual terms. These
values are also used by Conesa et al. (2000).
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2.4 Government
The government levies a proportional social security tax on labor income ¿ss;t to ¯nance a bene¯t
di;t;j;n per retiree. This system is assumed to be self-¯nanced, i.e.
NX
n=1
JX
j=1
IR¡1X
i=IA
¹i;t;j;nwj;thi;t;j;nei;j;n¿ss;t =
NX
n=1
JX
j=1
IX
i=IR
¹i;t;j;ndi;t;j;n (8)
where bene¯ts are computed as follows. Upon retirement an individual's pension is computed
applying a replacement rate over the average of earnings of the last 8 years before retirement.
This replacement rate is, 0% if an individual has been contributing for less than 15 years, 100%
if he has contributed for at least 35 years, and 60+20(n-15) in percent terms if the individual
has contributed at least 15 years but less than 35, where n is the number of contributed years.
The pension system in Spain also includes a maximum and a minimum pension level equal to
1.85 and 0.44 times the per-capita output in the spanish economy in 1995. Hence in age IR
bene¯ts are given by,
dIR;t;j = max(Pmin; min(Pmax;
rep
1 +¸
wav;j)) (9)
where ¸, rep, wav and Pmax are the productivity growth, the legal replacement rate, some
average of past earnings and the maximum pension bene¯t respectively. From age IR+ 1 to I ,
the pension bene¯t is normalized by productivity growth (1+¸), since new pensions are greater
than old ones, i.e. di;t;j;n =
di¡1;t;j;n
1+¸ . The government also levies a proportional tax on capital
¿k and labor ¿l income to ¯nance per capita government consumption Gt such that
NX
n=1
JX
j=1
IX
i=IA
¹i;t;j;n(rtai;t;j;n¿k + wj;thi;t;j;nei;j;n¿l) = Gt: (10)
In particular, we use a value of ¿k = 0:186 and ¿l = 0:17 as reported by Bosca et al. (1999).
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These values generate a government to output ratio of G=Y = 13:4 which is consistent with the
average of this number from 1970 to 1994 in Spain.
2.5 The Equilibrium
In this economy a Competitive Equilibrium is a list of sequences of quantities ci;t;j;n, hi;t;j;n,
ai;t;j;n, ¹i;t;j;n, di;t;j;n, Lt, Nt, Kt, prices wl;t, wh;t, rt, social security tax rates ¿ss;t and income
tax rates such that, at each point in time t: 1) ¯rms maximize pro¯ts setting wages and the
interest rate equal to marginal products, 2) agents maximize lifetime utility subject to the
period budget constraints taking as given wages, the interest rate, taxes, social security bene¯ts,
survival probabilities, the age structure of the population and accidental bequests, 3) the age
structure of the population f¹i;t;j;ng is stationary and follows the aggregate law of motion (1),
(2) and (3),
noindent 4) accidental bequests are given by
Bt =
P
n
P
j
P
i ¹i¡1;t¡1;j;nai;t;j;n(1 ¡ si¡1;t¡1;j)
(1 +nt¡1)
P
n
P
j
PI
i=IA ¹i;t;j;n
(11)
where nt¡1 is the growth rate of the population between period t ¡ 1 and t.
5) Market clearing conditions for capital and each type of labor holds,
Kt =
NX
n=1
JX
j=1
IX
i=IA
¹i;t;j;nai;t;j;n (12)
Ht =
NX
n=1
JX
j=1
IR¡1X
i=IE
¹i;t;j;nei;j;nhi;t;j;n (13)
Lt =
NX
n=1
JX
j=1
IE¡1X
i=IA
¹i;t;j;nei;j;nhi;t;j;n (14)
where IE denotes the age at which an individual starts being considered as an experienced
worker. Finally, the budget constraint of the government is satis¯ ed period by period.
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2.6 Computation Method
The computational procedure used to solve for the transitional dynamics of the model is standard
and follows Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987).
3 Findings
3.1 Aggregate Features
The initial steady state of the model economy has been calibrated to reproduce some key ag-
gregate ratios of the spanish economy in 1995 and the distribution of wages of the working
population. Hence, in the model economies considered there is inter and intra-generational
heterogeneity. This particular feature is important because since we want the model economy
to reproduce the share of GDP spent on pensions of the data which is between 8% and 9%,
it has to be able to endogenously generate a similar percentage of the retirees a®ected by the
minimum pension °oor as in the data being this number 23% for those individuals a±liated
to the Regimen General. In this respect, in the initial steady state of the model economy the
percentage of GDP spent on pensions is 7:17% and the percentage of the population receiving
the minimum pension level is 20% being these two numbers close to their empirical counter-
parts. Finally, in the model economy the percentage of pensioneers a®ected by the maximum
pension level is 0:16% being this number slightly higher than the one in data 0:015%. On the
other hand, recall the Gini index of wages was part of our calibration target being 0.311. In
this respect, the initial model economy generates endogenously a Gini index of earnings (after
taken into account hours worked) of 0.361 while the empirical counterpart in 1994 is 0.308. In
this framework, the government sets an immigration quota as a fraction of the total population,
while adjusting the social security tax rate to balance the pension system. The three cases
considered are immigration rates of 0%, 0:12% and 0:26%.
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3.2 Aggregate E®ects of Immigration policy
In the baseline experiement without immigration, the aging of the baby boom generation in-
creases the number of the retirees over the total population inducing an increase in the social
security tax rate in order to balance the government budget. The higher distorsions associated
with this higher taxes reduces the labor supply of individuals. In addition, with the aging of
the population the share of the population with high saving rates (the old) increases, and both
factors imply a rising trend in the capital labor ratio in the economy. Hence interest rates
decreases and wages are higher. As the baby-boom generation passes through this process is
reversed (see Figures 2 and 3). With an immigration rate of 0.12% and 0.26%, the process of
increasing capital labor ratio is less pronounced since we assume that immigrants arrive with no
wealth. In the model economy with perfect substitution between skilled and unskilled workers,
the in°ow of immigrants increases the tax base and partially alleviates the e®ects of the aging of
the baby-boom generation allowing for a less important increase in the social security tax rate
(see Figures 4 and 5).
In contrast, the dynamics of the social security tax rate is quantitatively di®erent in the model
economy with imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. In this model econ-
omy, an in°ow of unskilled workers aleads to an increase in the skill premium (see Figures 2
and 3). On the revenue side, a higher skill wage gives incentives to skilled individuals to work
harder and the lower unskilled wage reduces the work e®ort of less skilled individuals. Since
these low productive workers represents a higher fraction of the workforce with the in°ow of
unskilled immigrants, social security tax revenues are lower and requires a higher tax rate over
the initial periods of the transition. The most important implication of this change in the skill
premium comes from the pension bene¯ts side. Now skilled individuals have higher earnings
before retirement and hence they qualify for higher pension bene¯ts. On the other hand, un-
skilled individuals have lower earnings before retirement and qualify for lower pension bene¯ts,
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but the existence of a minimum pension limit means that this last e®ect does not compensate
the former. The implications of this behaviour is that, over the period of the aging of the baby-
boom generation 2035-2055, an immigration rate of 0.26% in the model economy with imperfect
substitution would be equivalent to an immigration rate of 0.12% in the model economy with
perfect substitution at least as the social security tax rate is concerned. Put it di®erently, half
of the reduction of the tax rate achieved through the high immigration rate scenario is lost due
to the consideration of imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled workers.
3.3 Winners and Losers from Immigration Policy
The aim of this section is to analyze the intra and inter-generational welfare consequences of
alternative immigration quotas on the native population living in the base year 1995. I follow
the standard practice which consists of calculating compensating variations at birth for agents
born with di®erent ability levels and across age groups. The compensating variation lists the
negative of the percentage that consumption must be increase or decrease by each period over
the lifetime of individuals so as they stay with the same utility as in the initial steady state
without the aging of the population. Consequently, the measure computed is positive if there is
a welfare gain. Table 2 shows the results in percentage terms for di®erent immigration policies
and the perfect (½ = 0) and imperfect (½ = 1:2) substitution case across skill groups.
In the model economy with perfect substitution, low ability individuals of all age groups expe-
rience welfare losses when immigration is di®erent from zero. As we consider individuals with
medium ability levels (from 10 t0 12) they start having gains from immigration, but only if
they age older than 30. Younger generations (20-29) still su®er welfare losses with immigration.
For high ability individuals, we ¯nd that all generations gain with immigration. The higher
the immigration rate, the higher the welfare gain. This result is driven by the fact that high
ability individuals have higher saving rates and consequently gain more from the higher interest
rates associated with the in°ow of immigrants. If we further compare these results with the
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model economy characterized by imperefect substitution the following features arise. Now, low
ability individuals have higher welfare losses with immigration, since the unskill wage is further
depressed. As one would expect, this a®ects relatively more to younger individuals since they
are a®ected by the lower earnings over a longer period. Something similar happens to agents
with ability level 10, i.e those who are unskilled but are the most productive. As compared to
the case of perfect substitution, now the welfare losses of the younger generations are higher.
Finally, in the imperfect substitution case, all the generations of skilled individuals gain from
immigration.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has extended the standard large overlapping generations model to allow for the inter-
action between changes in the relative labor supply of workers with di®erent skill levels and skill
premium. It is found that the macroeconomic and welfare e®ects of immigration depends crit-
ically on the modelling strategy concerning the complementarity between less and more skilled
workers. In particular, the results indicate that a model that abstracts from this complemen-
tarity overestimates the positive e®ects that immigration may have on the sustainability of the
social security system in next decades.
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Figure 1: Dependency Ratio for di®erent Immigration Rates
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Figure 2: Aggregate E®ects of Low Immigration Rate
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Figure 3: Aggregate E®ects of High Immigration rate
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Figure 4: Low Immigration Scenario
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Figure 5: High Immigration Scenario
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Table 1: Welfare of Immigration Policy
Age Ability 3 Ability 10 Ability 12 Ability 18
½ = 0 ½ = 1:2 ½ = 0 ½ = 1:2 ½ = 0 ½ = 1:2 ½ = 0 ½ = 1:2
Without Immigration
20-24 -0.7616 -0.5638 -0.9552 -0.5694 -0.9404 -1.0839 -2.3013 -2.3912
30-34 -0.2742 -0.1745 -0.3924 -0.1891 -0.3823 -0.4588 -1.4997 -1.5454
40-44 -0.0961 -0.0605 -0.6211 -0.5258 -0.6242 -0.6605 -0.9246 -0.9397
60-64 0.0255 0.0260 -0.1294 -0.1183 -0.1371 -0.1413 -0.1657 -0.1608
75-79 0.0058 0.0059 -0.0055 -0.0019 -0.0064 -0.0077 -0.0195 -0.0183
Low Immigration Scenario
20-24 -0.9566 -4.0520 -0.9913 -6.8304 -0.9638 1.2789 -2.2161 -0.7098
30-34 -0.3751 -1.8732 -0.3866 -3.5274 -0.3683 0.8682 -1.4243 -0.6745
40-44 -0.1390 -0.6450 -0.6040 -2.0057 -0.6021 -0.0418 -0.8539 -0.5843
60-64 0.0138 0.0130 -0.1111 -0.1020 -0.1167 -0.1227 -0.1386 -0.1353
75-79 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0057 -0.0158 -0.0151
High Immigration Scenario
20-24 -1.1758 -7.4902 -1.0333 -12.6005 -0.9897 3.4408 -2.1171 0.8899
30-34 -0.4930 -3.5694 -0.3841 -6.8333 -0.3560 2.0864 -1.3346 0.1696
40-44 -0.1889 -1.2197 -0.5833 -3.4766 -0.5757 0.5477 -0.7693 -0.2252
60-64 0.0001 -0.0037 -0.0892 -0.0841 -0.0924 -0.1019 -0.1063 -0.1059
75-79 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0016 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0037 -0.0116 -0.0115
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